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This experiment was designed to examine the effect of misinformation imparted through co-
witness discussions on memory reports and line-up decisions obtained after varied retention 
intervals. Two-hundred and eighty-nine participants viewed a simulated car-jacking and then heard 
co-witnesses describe their memory for the event. Confederate accounts included three plausible 
and three implausible pieces of misinformation. Memory for the event was assessed after five-
minutes, 50-minutes, two-days, or one-week. In addition to examining free-recall memory, we also 
looked at how misinformation about the perpetrator’s appearance affected recognition memory by 
obtaining identifications from culprit-present and absent lineups. One of the confederates falsely 
described the perpetrator having a tattoo on his neck, and one lineup filler had this feature. Results 
revealed that mistaken identifications of the tattooed filler increased significantly at the longer 
retention intervals, while recall for the misinformation decreased at the longer intervals. Also, as 
expected, plausible misinformation was recalled more often than implausible.  
  
 	  
In the early morning hours of a summer night in Southern California, Brenda J. and her 
friend were coming back from a night of bar hopping and were confronted by two men who 
demanded her car keys. After a brief struggle, one of the assailants took her purse and fled. The 
police interviewed the witnesses separately. Brenda recalled that the assailant had some type of 
undefined tattoos on his face, but her friend remembered him having the letters tattooed on his 
head. In the days after the event, the two friends talked more about the shared experience, and 
searched social media together, looking for pictures of tattoos similar to what they remembered. 
After reviewing dozens of pictures together, the two women arrived at the shared conclusion that 
the culprit had letters tattooed on his face (a merging of the two witnesses’ memory reports), and 
the women believed they may have even found a picture of the culprit. The witnesses then went 
back to the police with this new information, and the police immediately developed a suspect 
named Richard Torres who had letters tattooed on his face, similar to what the victims reported. 
The police then put Torres’ picture in a sequential line-up with five other individuals, none of 
whom had tattoos on their face, and administered it to both witnesses using double-blind 
procedures. Not surprisingly, both witnesses picked Torres from the line-up, and each noted the 
importance of the letter tattoos in making their decision (People v. Richard Torres, San Diego 
Superior Court; February, 2015, CD256364).	    
  Surveys of real eyewitnesses to crimes reveal that co-witnesses like Brenda J. and her 
friend frequently talk together about their shared experiences (Paterson & Kemp, 2006; 
Skagerberg & Wright, 2008). Moreover, because witnesses’ descriptions of perpetrators tend to 
vary after a crime (Gabbert & Brown, 2015), it is reasonable to assume that witnesses who 
participate in these post-event discussions are frequently exposed to inaccurate information about a 
perpetrator’s appearance. A growing body of empirical research shows that, when people talk 
about their memories, they can influence each other such that their subsequent individual memory 
reports become similar to one another, as demonstrated in the Torres case (for reviews, see 
Gabbert & Hope, 2013; Wright, Memon, Skagerberg, & Gabbert, 2009). This phenomenon is 
typically referred to as memory conformity (Wright, Self, & Justice, 2000).  
The majority of memory conformity research has focused on examining how misleading 
information encountered during co-witness discussions is subsequently reported in an interview or 
written statement (Gabbert & Hope, 2013). However, the extent to which co-witness discussion 
can influence subsequent facial recognition decisions is relatively under-researched. Since recall 
and recognition rely on different underlying psychological processes (e.g., Schooler, 2002; Wells, 
1985), it cannot be assumed that both are susceptible to memory conformity effects to the same 
extent. Zajac and Henderson's (2009) study is one of the few that has examined how co-witness 
discussions could directly influence identifications from lineups. Here, participants viewed a video 
of a staged theft, after which half of the participants were misinformed by a confederate that the 
thief’s accomplice had blue eyes (when they were actually brown). Misinformed participants were 
significantly more likely than controls to describe the accomplice as having blue eyes, and were 
twice as likely to misidentify a blue-eyed suspect from a culprit-absent lineup.  
 Zajac and Henderson's (2009) findings can potentially be explained by recoding, or 
retrieval-based, interference, whereby faces, when described, are translated from visual to verbal 
information (see also Alogna et al., 2014; Meissner,  Brigham & Kelly, 2001). If the verbal 
memory contains inaccurate information, and is relied upon during the identification test, then the 
participant will be less likely to correctly identify the target. For example, Meissner, Sporer, and 
Susa (2008) found that errors in descriptions can interfere with a witness’s later ability to make an 
accurate identification decision. Unfortunately, because Zajac and Henderson only used target-
absent lineups, they could not examine how this misinformation affected the witnesses’ ability to 
recognize the target. The current experiment addresses this issue by looking at the how suggested 
misinformation encountered from co-witness discussions could lead witnesses to select a specific 
suspect who possesses a suggested trait in both culprit-present and culprit-absent conditions.   
 The current study also seeks to extend Zajac and Henderson's (2009) work by examining 
the effect of the misinformation on witness performance after varied retention intervals, ranging 
from five-minutes to a week. The retention interval in the Zajac and Henderson experiments was 
quite brief, whereas lineup identifications in actual cases are often made following much longer 
delays. Previous research has demonstrated the importance of accounting for longer retention 
intervals when studying eyewitness memory (Deffenbacher, Bornstein, McGorty, & Penrod, 
2008). This work has shown that descriptions of perpetrators provided after longer delays tend to 
be less complete (Van Koppen & Lochun, 1997), and has also revealed a linear decline in the 
correct identifications of previously seen faces after longer delays (Shapiro & Penrod, 1986).  
Moreover, recent research has shown that even very modest alterations in the retention-interval 
between verbal descriptions and identifications can lead to significant differences in verbal 
overshadowing effects (Alogna et al., 2014). Since face memory tends to decline over time, we 
hypothesized that the misinformation encountered during co-witness discussions related to the 
culprit’s appearance would have a greater effect on witnesses’ lineup decisions made at longer 
retention intervals, as memory for the perpetrator's face fades.  
Many factors can influence whether a suggested detail is accepted and later reported, for 
example, not detecting the discrepancy and accepting it without question (Blank, 1998; Loftus, 
2005), detecting it but then making a source error (Horry, Colton, & Williamson, 2014), and 
detecting the discrepancy but reporting it anyway due to believing it is likely to be correct (Allan 
& Gabbert, 2013). Since discrepancies in plausible post-event misinformation are less likely to be 
detected, plausible suggestions are more likely to be believed than non-plausible items (Berntsen 
& Rubin, 2007; Pezdek & Blandon-Gitlin, 2009). Furthermore, people are more likely to accept 
misleading post-event details that concern schema-relevant items (i.e., plausible), in comparison to 
low expectancy items that are more salient (Meade & Roediger, 2002; Walther, et.al.,  2002). 
Scoboria et al. (2012) explains that suggested events that are detected (remembered) and judged to 
be implausible are often evaluated and dismissed quite rapidly. However, Scoboria (2012) also 
argued that, although the information that is judged to be personally implausible is less likely to 
lead to memory change, the threshold for this effect may be lower than previously thought, such 
that even suggestions that are judged to be minimally plausible can lead to memory change under 
some circumstances. 
The Current Study 
The current study examined how suggested information about the perpetrator’s appearance 
(i.e., having a tattoo on his neck) affected identifications made from photo arrays after varied 
retention intervals ranging from five-minutes to one-week. It was predicted that participants who 
heard the suggestion that the culprit had a tattoo on his neck would be more likely to misidentify 
the filler who possessed this feature from a lineup, particularly at longer retention intervals, when 
memory for the perpetrator’s face has faded. The current study also examined participants' free 
recall memory for plausible and implausible suggested misinformation assessed after varied 
retention intervals ranging from five-minutes to one-week. Consistent with previous research, we 
predicted that witnesses would be less likely to be influenced by misinformation that is considered 
to be implausible.  
Method 
Participants  
Participants were 289 introductory psychology students at a university in Southern 
California (69.6% female). The age of the participants ranged from 18 to 63 (M = 20.1, SD = 
3.73). The racial background of participants varied, with 53.3% identifying themselves as Latino, 
23.5% Asian, 6.6% Anglo/Caucasian, and 5.9% African American. The remaining 9.0% of 
participants identified themselves as being mixed or other.  
Procedure 
 Sessions involved five co-witnesses: three participants and two confederates. The five co-
witnesses were seated around a table and in front of a 30” television monitor. Participants first 
completed a consent form where they were informed this was a study about memory. They then 
viewed a video of a simulated car-jacking. Participants were instructed to pay close attention to the 
details of the crime simulation, and were told that they would be tested about their memory for the 
event and the people involved. 
The video. The carjack video lasted one minute and seven seconds. The first 50 seconds of 
the video showed a Latino Male in his 20s with a shaved head on his cell phone in the forefront of 
the screen (the perpetrator) watching two women walking towards their cars. The man on his cell 
phone was approximately 25 feet from the camera, and he was standing by an SUV to give 
witnesses a clear reference point for his height and weight. His exposed neck was clearly visible 
from all angles, as he nervously shifted his position relative to the camera while watching the 
women. The two women hugged each other, and one of them got into her car and drove away. The 
second woman (the victim) then started to enter her car. As she opened her car door, the 
perpetrator pulled a gun from his waistband, ran towards her, demanded her keys, and stole her 
car.  
Sharing statements after the event: Conveying the misinformation. After viewing the 
video, participants were instructed to treat the event as if they were a witness to an actual crime in 
a police investigation, and were asked to provide eyewitness statements that would assist the 
police in catching the culprit. Each participant was asked to state aloud what they remembered 
from the video, and were asked to speak one at a time so the experimenter could write down 
everything they said verbatim. They were specifically asked to make sure to include all details 
regarding the perpetrator’s appearance such as height, weight, age, race, hairstyle, dress, as well as 
other defining features such as scars, tattoos, and jewelry that would assist the police in capturing 
the culprit. Participants were instructed not to comment on the statements made by the others in 
the group or to interrupt others while they were talking. This was done to ensure that the 
confederates' memory reports could be communicated without interruption, and to make sure that 
the misinformation provided within these reports was not publicly challenged or contradicted.  
Participants were seated at the table and spoke in turns from left to right. The confederates 
were always positioned on either end of the group (in the first and last chairs). This seating 
arrangement ensured that the confederates would always give their accounts first and last. The 
confederates memorized a script describing a fairly comprehensive account of the event that 
included 14 pieces of correct information relating to the perpetrator’s description and actions, and 
the victim’s description and actions. The script also included three key errors for each confederate; 
thus, participants were exposed to six items of misinformation in total (here forward, the 
misinformation). All statements made by the participants and confederates in these sessions were 
recorded verbatim.  
The misinformation. The six misinformation items were designed to be related to 
plausible or implausible aspects of the event. Five of the six misinformation items were related to 
descriptive features of the perpetrator’s appearance that would have clear forensic relevance in an 
investigation: height, race, hairstyle, clothing, and the presence of tattoos. The sixth piece of 
misinformation was related to whether the perpetrator was smoking a cigarette and snuffed it out 
at the scene, which might provide a way to obtain physical trace evidence.  
The three plausible misinformation items included the following suggestions: (1) the 
perpetrator was over six feet tall, possibly 6’4” or 6’5” (when he was actually 5’10”); (2) he had 
on long pants (when he was actually wearing shorts); and (3) he had a tattoo on his neck (when he 
did not). The three implausible misinformation items included the following suggestions: (1) the 
perpetrator had short hair – an inch to an inch and a half long (when he was actually bald); (2) the 
culprit was African-American (when he was actually Latino); and (3) he flicked a cigarette away 
(when he actually was not smoking and was on a cell phone the entire time).  
The counterbalancing of confederate statements. The presentation of the 
misinformation by the confederates was counterbalanced across groups by changing the 
positioning of confederates at the table, so they alternated in presenting their memory reports first 
and last. One confederate reported recalling the three plausible errors, and the other reported the 
three implausible errors. This allowed us to counterbalance the presentation of the plausible and 
implausible information. Multiple research assistants rotated roles as confederates. 
The experimenter recorded all witness statements verbatim to ensure the misinformation 
was properly reported, and also to document how often participants repeated the misinformation 
during this initial group recall session. All analyses controlled for the order of the presentation of 
the misinformation (if the misinformation in question came before or after each participant spoke). 
Also, all analyses controlled for whether the misinformation was repeated by the participant and/or 
anyone else in their small group during this initial co-witness session. 
Retention intervals. Participants were randomly assigned to one of four experimental 
groups, where the delay between encountering the misinformation and reporting memories of the 
event was either five minutes, 50 minutes, 48 hours, or one week. A fifth (control) group did not 
encounter any misinformation, and was tested after a five-minute delay. Memory reports were 
obtained using a free recall format, followed by specific open-ended prompts. Specifically, 
participants were first asked to report everything they remembered about the carjack video, 
including everything they mentioned when providing verbal statements right after the event in the 
small group sessions, as well as anything else they may have remembered that they did not recall 
and/or report earlier. The open-ended prompts then encouraged participants to describe specific 
elements of the perpetrator’s appearance, including his race, type and color of clothes, color and 
length of hair, height, defining features (any scars, tattoos, jewelry, etc.), and actions. These non-
suggestive open-ended prompts were related to the six-misinformation items (clothes, height, 
tattoos, race, hair style, and actions). Again, participants were asked to treat this as though they 
were witnesses to an actual police investigation. 
Identifying the culprit from the photo array. After completing the memory 
questionnaire, the participants were administered either a culprit present or absent six-person 
photographic lineup. As noted earlier, one of the confederates had suggested that the culprit had a 
tattoo on his neck during the small group co-witness session, and one of the fillers in the lineup 
had a tattoo photoshopped onto his neck. Before viewing the lineup, participants were read the 
pre-lineup admonishment used by the Los Angeles Police Department. 
I am going to show you a group of photographs. This group may or may not contain a 
picture of the person who committed the crime now being investigated. Keep in mind that 
hairstyles, beards, and mustaches may be easily changed. Also keep in mind that 
photographs may not always depict the true complexion of the person; it may be lighter or 
darker than shown in the photo. Pay no attention to markings or numbers that may appear 
on the photos or any other differences in the type of style of photographs. 
After being read the admonition, participants were asked if they recognized the carjacker from the 
video in the lineup, and, if so, to indicate who they thought he was. 
Lineup construction. A pool of 20 pictures were selected depicting possible fillers who 
were judged to be similar to the culprit in terms of age, race, hairstyle, and general appearance. 
These pictures were shown to a group of 40 participants who judged each picture on how similar it 
was to the culprit. The top six most similar pictures were used to construct the lineup. Lineup 
fairness was assessed using a mock lineup method; Tredoux’s E = 1.40.  
Twelve versions of the lineup were created: six for culprit-present (CP) and six for culprit-
absent (CA), with each member rotated to a different position of the six-person photographic 
lineup. For the culprit-absent lineup, the target was replaced with a picture of his brother, who was 
designated as the nominated suspect. Pilot testing revealed that, of the six pictures, the brother’s 
picture was judged to be most similar to the target, and the filler with the tattoo was judged to be 
third most similar of the six. The 12 lineups were administered in a counterbalanced manner to 
ensure random assignment; alternating between culprit presence and absence, and also rotating the 
positioning of the pictures within each condition. The lineups were administered on a computer 
faced away from the experimenter so they were blind to the target’s position.  
Determining plausibility. Ten graduate students and their advisor first made judgments of 
what they believed were plausible and implausible suggestions that could be used in the study 
based on viewing the carjacking video. From these suggestions, three plausible and three 
implausible suggestions were selected. The process of selecting the items to be used emphasized 
the importance of the implausible suggestions not being ridiculous or impossible. Rather, the 
implausible suggestions were designed to be very unlikely, but possible. We then obtained 
likelihood ratings, through pilot testing. Independent ratings were obtained from a sample of 38 
participants who viewed the car-jacking video and then rated how likely each misinformation item 
was on a 1–8 scale; with 1 being not likely at all and 8 being very likely. Here are the ratings for 
the implausible suggestions: (1) the suggestion that the culprit was African-American was judged 
to be likely or very likely by 18.4% of pilot participants; (2) the suggestion that the culprit had 
short hair – about an inch to an inch and a half long was judged to be likely or very likely by 
13.5% of participants; and (3) the suggestion that the culprit flicked a cigarette was judged as 
likely or very likely by 18% of participants. Here are the ratings for the plausible suggestion: (1) 
the suggestion that the culprit had a tattoo on his neck was judged to be likely or very likely by 
57.9% of participants;  (2) the suggestion that the perpetrator was over six feet tall, possibly 6’4” 
or 6’5” was rated as likely or very likely by 23.7% of participants; and (3) the suggestion that the 
culprit had long pants was judged to be likely by 26.3% participants. Overall, the three plausible 
misinformation items were judged to be more likely to have been in the video, M = 3.35, SE = .21, 
(95% CI [2.92 - 3.27]), than the implausible items, M = 2.67, SE = .18, (95% CI [2.31 - 3.01]).  
Data from Table 3 shows the frequency that each misinformation item was reported by 
participants in the small group co-witness sessions (after the suggestions were made by the 
confederates who spoke first). These data further verify the validity of the distinction between the 
plausible and implausible item groupings. Close examination of this table shows that all of the 
plausible items were more likely to be reported than any of the implausible items. When 
examining how many participants in each small group reported recalling the misinformation items (after the suggestions were made by the confederates who spoke first), the differences between the 
plausible and implausible items were even larger.  
Coding of the participants' memory reports. The features of events method was used to 
code the participants' free recall memory for the details of the perpetrator and the crime in general 
(Dickinson & Poole, 2000). A checklist was created that included all of the correct information 
contained in the confederates’ statements and the six pieces of misinformation reported during the 
small group co-witness session and for their final memory reports given after the varied retention 
intervals. Pairs of coders read the responses of each participant and then independently recorded 
which items each participant recalled that had previously been reported by the confederates. Initial 
rate of agreement across raters was over 98%. Disagreements were resolved through group 
discussion at a weekly lab meeting.  
Results 
Identifying the Man with the Tattoo 
Rates of choosing the filler with the tattoo on his neck, the culprit (or nominated suspect in 
the culprit-absent condition), and the next most chosen picture can be found in Table 1. Since 
more than half of the participants were Latino, ethnicity was dummy coded as Latino vs. others for 
these analyses to examine potential cross-race effects. Also, data were coded for which 
confederate spoke first during the group report. In addition, a dummy variable was created for 
whether the participant stated that they recalled seeing a tattoo during the initial group discussion 
(initial report of tattoo). 
Because of the group nature of the sessions, it was possible that hearing another participant 
in the group report recalling the tattoo might have an effect on the participants’ memory and/or 
lineup performance. To control for this possibility, data from the initial group discussion were 
coded to indicate if the participant and/or anyone else in each small group reported recalling the 
tattoo during the co-witness misinformation sessions. 
A hierarchical binary logistic regression was conducted with identification decision as the 
dependent variable (tattooed filler vs. other), and the following predictors: retention interval 
(control vs. 5-minutes vs. 50-minutes vs. 2-days vs. 1-week), culprit presence (present vs. absent), 
race (Latino vs. other), order that the two confederates spoke (tattoo suggestion before vs. after the 
participants gave their report), and initial report of the tattoo by the participant during the group 
co-witness session (yes vs. no). In the first block, all main effects were entered, on the second, 
two-way interactions were entered, and, on the third, three-way interactions were examined. The 
predictor model was a significant improvement over the constant-only model, X2(5, N = 289) = 
13.21, p < .02. Participants were 1.2 times more likely to identify the tattooed filler after one week 
than the controls (B = .18, SE = .09, Wald = 3.95, p = .05, eB = 1.20). When the culprit was not 
present in the lineup, participants were 60% more likely to identify the filler with the tattoo than 
when the culprit was present (B = -.51, SE = .25, Wald = 4.20, p = .04, eB = .60). No significant 
effect was found for race (B = -.43, SE = .25, Wald = 2.81, p=.09, eB = .65), order of the 
confederate’s report, before-or-after the participants spoke (B = .15, SE = .25, Wald = .37, p = .55, 
eB = 1.17), or whether the participants reported recalling the tattoo during the group co-witness 
session (B = .93, SE = .95, Wald = .95, p=.33, eB = 2.53). See Table 1 for choosing rates across all 
conditions. When two-way interactions were added, the second block of the analyses showed no 
significant improvement in the model, X2(7, N = 289) = 12.55, ns, and the third block also did not 
show improvement X2(7, N = 289) = 10.57, ns. These analyses were repeated to control for 
whether anyone in each participant’s small group co-witness session reported recalling the tattoo. 
This was accomplished by replacing the predictor variable for whether the participant reported 
recalling the tattoo during the co-witness session with the variable that indicated whether the 
participant and/or anyone else in their small group reported recalling the tattoo during the co-
witness session. This did not result in any changes to the effects described above. 
A second hierarchical binary logistic regression was conducted using repeated contrasts to 
examine incremental differences across the four delay conditions. For this analysis, the no-
misinformation control group was removed, and only the four different retention interval groups 
who heard the misinformation were examined (5-minutes vs. 50-minutes vs. 2-days vs. 1-week). 
As with the previous analyses, identification decision was the dependent variable (tattooed filler 
vs. other), with the following predictors: retention interval (control vs. 5-minutes vs. 50-minutes 
vs. 2-days vs. 1-week), culprit presence (present vs. absent), race (Latino vs. other), order that the 
two confederates spoke (tattoo suggestion before vs. after the participants gave their report), and 
participants report of the tattoo during the group co-witness session (yes vs. no). In the first block, 
all main effects were entered, on the second, two-way interactions were entered, and, on the third, 
three-way interactions were examined. The predictor model was a significant improvement over 
the constant-only model, X2(7, N = 289) = 15.22, p = .03. When considering differences across the 
retention intervals, participants were 1.8 times more likely to identify the filler with the tattoo after 
one week, compared to two days (B = -.77, SE = .40, Wald = 3.64, p = .057, eB = 2.15). However, 
this predicted directional effect was only statistically significant with a one-tailed analysis. When 
the culprit was not present in the lineup, participants were 52% more likely to identify the filler 
with the tattoo than when the culprit was present (B = -.66, SE = .27, Wald = 5.70, p = .02, eB = 
52). Again, no effect was found for race (B = -.50, SE = .28, Wald = 3.08, p = .08, eB = .61), the 
order or the confederate’s presentation (B = -.18, SE = .29, Wald = .40, p = .53, eB = 1.20) or 
whether the participant reported recalling the tattoo during the group co-witness session (B = .87, 
SE = .97, Wald = .79, p = .37, eB = 2.38). When two-way interactions were added, the second 
block of the analyses showed no significant improvement in the model, X2(8, N = 289) = 12.87, p 
= .12. Again, the predictor variable for whether the participant reported recalling the tattoo during 
the initial group session was replaced with the more inclusive predictor that indicated whether the 
participant and/or anyone else in their small group reported recalling the tattoo during the co-
witness session. Again, this did not result in any changes to the effects described above. 
Free Recall of the Misinformation 
Scales were created for proportion of errors on the plausible and implausible items in the 
recall sessions conducted at the various retention intervals. Scales were also created for whether 
participants reported the plausible and implausible items during the initial small group co-witness 
sessions (after hearing the misinformation). Also, as done with the regression analyses, in order to 
control for the possibility that other people in each participant’s small group co-witness session 
reported recalling any of the misinformation items, additional scales were created assessing 
whether the participant and/or any other people in the small group reported remembering any of 
the plausible or implausible misinformation items after hearing the misinformation. The 
distribution of errors for plausible and implausible items can be seen in Tables 2 and 3.  
Initial errors on plausible misinformation items made during the group co-witness sessions 
were correlated with plausible errors in the final recall sessions conducted after the varied 
retention intervals (r [289] = .41, p < .001), but were not related to errors on implausible items 
made during the initial group co-witness session (r [289] = -.05, ns), or implausible errors in the 
final recall sessions (r [289] = .10, p = .09). Initial plausible group errors (if the participant and/or 
anyone in the small group reported the plausible misinformation items during the initial small 
group co-witness session) were also correlated with plausible errors in the final recall sessions 
conducted after the varied retention intervals (r [289] = .35, p < .001), but were not related to 
implausible errors in the final recall session (r [289] = .11, p = .06).  Similarly, implausible errors 
made during the initial group co-witness sessions were related to implausible errors made during 
the final recall sessions (r [289] = .27, p < .001), but not related to plausible errors made either 
initially on the group session, or after a delay. 
To examine the effect of plausibility and retention interval on the misinformation recalled, 
a mixed factorial ANOVA was conducted with plausibility as a within-subjects factor (i.e., errors 
on plausible and implausible items at the final recall sessions), and retention interval (control, 50-
min., 2-days, 1-week) and order of the confederates’ presentation of the misinformation as 
between-subject factors. In order to control for initial acceptance of the misinformation during the 
small group sessons, participant reports of recalling the plausible and implausible misinformation 
items during the co-witness sessions were also added as between-subjects factors. As predicted, a 
main effect for plausibility was revealed, with the plausible misinformation being more likely to 
be included in the memory reports of the participants, F(1, 275) = 17.08, p < .001, ηp2 = .06. Also, 
a main effect for retention interval was revealed, F(4, 275) = 2.61, p = 04, ηp2 = .04. Tukey post-
hoc tests indicated that, compared to the control group, more misinformation was reported in the 
5-minute delay group, M Diff. = .05, SE = .02, p = .04, 95% CI = .0009 – .1080, the 50-minute 
delay group, M Diff. = -.07, SE = .02, p = .005, 95% CI = .0150 – .1250, the two-day delay group, 
M Diff. = .05, SE = .02, p = .05, 95% CI = -.0004 – .1012, and the 1-week delay, group M Diff. = 
.05, SE = .02, p = .05, 95% CI = -.0004 – .1012. However, no significant incremental differences 
were found between the different retention intervals. 
No effect for the order of the confederates’ presentation was revealed, F(1, 275) = .66, p = 
.42, ηp2 = .002. However, if a participant repeated the misinformation reported by the confederate 
in the initial small group co-witness session, they were more likely recall the misinformation in the 
final recall session.  This was true for both plausible, F(1, 275) = 45.49, p < .001, ηp2 = .14, and 
implausible information, F(1, 275) = 8.1, p = .01, ηp2 = .03. No interaction between these variables 
and delay was found. 
Supplemental analyses were conducted after replacing the between-subjects variables of 
initial plausible and initial implausible errors made by the participants during the group co-witness 
sessions with a more inclusive variable indicating whether the participant and/or anyone else in the 
small group reported any of the plausible or implausible items during the initial group session.  
These analyses revealed the same pattern of results. 
Discussion 
The current study examined the effect of plausibility and retention interval on memory for 
misinformation delivered within a co-witness paradigm. We were particularly interested in how 
overhearing plausible post-event misinformation from a co-witness, related to a distinctive feature 
of the perpetrator’s appearance (i.e., a neck tattoo), would affect witnesses’ identification decisions 
when viewing a lineup where one of the fillers has this suggested feature. 
As predicted, the tattooed filler was selected most often at the longer retention intervals 
when the witnesses’ memory for the perpetrator was likely weakest. Table 1 shows that, when the 
culprit was absent, participants in the 5-minute delay condition selected the tattooed filler at the 
same rate as the nominated suspect, and were no more likely to select the tattooed filler then 
participants in the no-misinformation control condition. However, after 50-minutes, selection of 
the tattooed filler increased substantially from 28.6% to 47.8%, and continued to increase as the 
retention interval grew longer.  Moreover, this shift towards selecting the tattooed filler at the 
longer retention intervals was accompanied by a shift away from identifying the nominated 
suspect, indicating that the post-event information suggesting that the perpetrator had a tattoo on 
his neck had a greater effect on choosing when memory for the perpetrator’s face faded. The 
misinformation effect was most powerful after 1-week, when identifications of the tattooed filler 
mushroomed to 60%, while selection of the nominated suspect bottomed out at 7%.  
When the actual culprit was present, the same general effect for time delay was observed; 
however, the effect was only evident at the longest retention interval, when selection of the 
tattooed filler increased to 44% (up from 32% after five-minutes). Up to that point, the actual 
culprit was chosen at a rate that was comparable to, or greater than the tattooed filler. Unlike the 
pattern observed in the culprit-absent condition, where selection of the tattooed filler at the longer 
delays was associated with a decline in choosing the nominated suspect, identification of the actual 
culprit remained stable over time, and the shift toward selecting the tattooed filler after one-week 
was associated with a decrease in choosing the other fillers. Theoretically, those individuals who 
did not recall his face well had a weak ecphoric experience when viewing the lineup, were more 
likely to shift to secondary processes and rely on other information independent of recognition 
memory to make their identification decision. In this case, it appears that they were influenced by 
their memory for the misinformation that the perpetrator had a tattoo on his neck. 
 It is worth noting that the tattooed filler was a very good match to the perpetrator (Pilot 
testing showed that the tattooed filler was selected third most often of the pictures used - tied for 
third). Table 1 shows that in both the control, and five-minute delay conditions, the tattooed filler 
was chosen at the same rate as the next most selected photo when the culprit was absent, and 
slightly more often than the culprit when he was present. However, despite these initially 
comparable rates of choosing, results revealed that the predicted increase in false identifications of 
the tattooed filler over time was clearly substantial, particularly in the culprit-absent conditions, 
where choosing of the tattooed filler more than doubled from 28.6% after five minutes to 60% 
after one week. 
The real-world implications of these findings are clear; when an outside source suggests to 
a witness that a perpetrator has a unique feature, this can affect the co-witness’s memory for the 
perpetrator, and, in turn, impact that witness’s ability to make accurate identification decisions 
when viewing subsequent lineups. Although, in many cases, the authorities will make sure that 
unique features like tattoos are consistent across fillers, this is not always the case.  
Memory for the Misinformation 
Participants were more likely to misremember plausible misinformation suggested by the 
confederate co-witness at all retention intervals. Previous research has shown that post-event 
information is more likely to be accepted when it is plausible, and when it does not contradict, or 
attempt to transform, a person’s memory for the details of the event (Gabbert, Memon, & Wright, 
2006). In this study, five of the six misinformation items did, in fact, contradict the elements of the 
person’s appearance and/or actions, and only the suggestion that he had a tattoo was purely 
additive. Not surprisingly, the tattoo suggestion was most likely to be misremembered at all 
retention intervals.  
Participants’ recall for the suggested misinformation was greatest after 50-minutes, and 
was lowest overall after one week. This effect was clearest for the plausible misinformation. 
Schwartz and Wright (2012) found that witness conformity effects are strongest when the post-
event information is presented closer to the test, simply because the misinformation is most likely 
to be recalled after a shorter retention interval. Although retention interval effects were not 
particularly strong in this study, these findings generally fit that pattern. 
Recognition Versus Recall: The Differential Effect of the Retention Interval 
Although free recall for the post-event misinformation provided by the co-witnesses 
dropped off after the 50-minute retention interval, the effect of the suggested information on 
lineup performance increased after this delay, and was highest after one week. At the longer 
retention intervals, participants were far more likely to choose the filler with the tattoo than to 
report remembering that the perpetrator had a tattoo. For example, after one-week, only 13% of 
participants reported recalling the tattoo, whereas 60% of participants in the culprit-absent 
condition chose the tattooed filler. This shows that most of the participants who selected the 
tattooed filler after one week did not show clear independent evidence of consciously recalling the 
tattoo. A similar pattern was revealed in the culprit-present condition. As noted earlier, the 
increased effect of the tattoo suggestion on lineup performance at the longer retention intervals 
appeared to be associated with an inevitable decline in participants’ memory for the perpetrator's 
face. 
Summary 
The current findings show that both recall and recognition are vulnerable to suggestions 
from others. When this occurs in the context of a forensic investigation, consistent statements 
obtained from witnesses might be seized upon as valuable corroborative evidence from 
independent witnesses, when, in fact, the evidence might be contaminated if one mistaken 
witnesses has discussed their erroneous memories with others. This is especially true when 
ecphoric experience cannot be relied upon, and individuals rely on secondary deliberative 
processes to inform their identification decision. In actual cases, lineups are frequently conducted 
after much longer delays than used in this study. These data indicate that, if witnesses encounter 
erroneous information about a suspect’s appearance after the event, but before the identification 
procedure, then their lineup decisions can be affected by this misinformation, even when the actual 
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 Table	  1.	  	  Percentage	  of	  participants	  who	  selected	  the	  tattooed	  filler,	  the	  nominated	  suspect/actual	  culprit,	  and	  the	  next	  most	  selected	  photo	  for	  culprit	  absent	  and	  culprit	  present	  conditions	  across	  all	  retention	  intervals.	  	  	   Culprit	  Absent	   Culprit	  Present	  	   Nominated	  	   Tattooed	   Next	  Most	   Actual	   Tattooed	   Next	  Most	  	   Suspect	   Filler	   Chosen	  Pic	   Culprit	   Filler	  	   Chosen	  Pic	  Control	   20.8%	   29.2%	   29.2%	   26.9%	   30.8%	   11.5%	  5-­‐minutes	   28.6%	   28.6%	   28.6%	   25.0%	   32.1%	   10.7%	  50-­‐minutes	   8.7%	   47.8%	   21.7%	   26.9%	   30.8%	   15.4%	  2-­‐days	   12.1%	   48.5%	   21.2%	   34.4%	   22.9%	   14.3%	  1-­‐week	   6.7%	   60.0%	   16.7%	   34.4%	   43.8%	   6.3%	  	  	  	   	  
Table	  2.	  Percentage	  of	  participants	  who	  reported	  recalling	  each	  misinformation	  item	  at	  the	  various	  retention	  intervals.	  	  	   	   Plausible	  Misinformation	  Items	   Implausible	  Misinformation	  Items	  	   Tattoo	  	  	   Over	   	   Long	  	   Short	   	   	   African-­‐	  	  	  Cigarette	  	   on	  Neck	   6’	  Tall	   	   Pants	   Hair	   	   American	   Flicked	  Misinformation	  Reported	  	  During	  the	  Small	  Group	  Co-­‐witness	  Session	  Participant*	   3.0%	   3.6%	   4.3%	   	   2.4%	   	   2.4%	   0.8%	   	  Group**	  	  	   	   7.2%	   8.4%	   12.0%	   	   3.0%	   	   4.1%	   2.4%	  Misinformation	  Reported	  	  During	  the	  Final	  Recall	  Session	  Control	   	  	  	   0%	  	   2.0%	  	   3.7%	   	   1.0%	   	   	   0%	   0%	  5-­‐min.	   	   16.7%	   11.1%	   4.8%	   	   9.3%	   	   1.9%	   0%	  50-­‐min.	   	   24.0%	   10.0%	   6.0%	   	   4.0%	   	   8.0%	   0%	  2-­‐days	   	   19.1%	  	   11.8%	   1.5%	   	   8.8%	   	   2.9%	   0%	  1-­‐week	   	   14.5%	   8.1%	  	   4.8%	   	   9.7%	   	   3.3%	   0%	  ________________________________________________________________________________________________________	  	   	   	  *	  Initial	  reports	  given	  by	  the	  participant	  during	  the	  small	  group	  co-­‐witness	  session,	  when	  the	  confederate	  presenting	  that	  misinformation	  spoke	  first.	  	  	  **Initial	  reports	  by	  the	  participant	  and/or	  anyone	  else	  in	  each	  small	  group	  co-­‐witness	  session	  when	  the	  confederate	  presenting	  that	  misinformation	  spoke	  first.	  	  	  	   	  
	  Table	  3.	  Information	  reported	  across	  retention	  intervals	  	   	   	  	   	   Effect	  Size	  	   Misinformation	  Recalled	  	   	   	  	   	   Plausible	  vs.	  Implausible	   Plausible	  MI	   Implausible	  MI	  	   N	  	   Cohen’s	  d	   M	   SD	   95%	  CI	   M	   SD	   	   95%	  CI	  	  Control	   56	   	   .17	   	   .08	  (.27)	   .01	  -­‐	  .16	   .04	   (.20)	   -­‐.02	  -­‐	  .10	  5-­‐minutes	   50	   	   .42	   .32	  (.54)	   .18	  -­‐	  .47	   .13	  	   (.33)	   .04	  -­‐	  .21	   	  50-­‐minutes	   71	   	   .55	   	   .42	  (.67)	   .23	  -­‐	  .61	   .12	   (.39)	   .01	  -­‐	  .23	   	  	   	  2-­‐days	   62	   	   .43	   	   .31	  (.58)	   .17	  -­‐	  .45	   .11	   (.32)	   .04	  -­‐	  .19	   	  1-­‐Week	   50	   	   .32	   	   .29	  (.46)	   .17	  -­‐	  .41	   .15	   (.40)	   .04	  -­‐	  .25	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  
 
